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Rule Synthesis
and Explanatory Synthesis:
A Socratic Dialogue Between IREAC and TREAT
Michael D. Murray*
PLATO: By way of introduction, this conversation concerns two forms of
synthesis of legal authorities-rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis.
Socrates inquired, as he is wont to do, What is the difference between
these two forms of synthesis in legal discourse? He sought the two persons
best able to answer his question: Ireacus, the practitioner of IREAC and
rule synthesis, and Treatis, the practitioner of TREAT and of both rule
synthesis and explanatory synthesis. Socrates insinuated himself into a
dialogue with these two at the corner of the Academy occupied by Michael
D. Murray. In accord with our custom, I endeavored to record the dialogue
of Socrates,' while Michael Murray promised to provide footnotes.
SOCRATES: My dear Ireacus, dear sweet Treatis, how fortunate I am to
encounter you here.
IREACUS: The pleasure is ours, Socrates.
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. Professor Murray thanks Kristen K. Robbins-Tiscione
(Georgetown), Christy DeSanctis (George Washington), David E. Sorkin (John Marshall-Chicago), and the participants in the
Scholars' Forum of the Capital Area Legal Writing Conference at George Washington University Law School, February 25,
2011, for their thoughtful and insightful comments on this article, and Linda Berger (Mercer), Bruce Berner (Valparaiso),
Bruce Ching (Valparaiso), Michael DeSanctis (Jenner & Block), Terry Phelps (American), and the participants in the
"Rhetoric and Persuasion: The Substance of Our Discipline" session at the 2011 AALS Annual Meeting, Legal Writing,
Reasoning, and Research Section for their comments on the presentation of this article. He also thanks Jenna Throw,
Valparaiso JD candidate 2011, for her research assistance.
1 E.g. Plato, Phaedrus (Benjamin Jowett trans.), http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/7_phaedrus.htm (accessed
Mar. 26, 2011), Plato, Gorgias (Benjamin Jowett trans.), http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/ 15_gorgias.htm
(accessed Mar. 26, 2011), and Plato, Phaedo (Benjamin Jowett trans.), http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/
dialogues/14_phaedo.htm (accessed Mar. 26, 2011).
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SOCRATES: I wonder if I may prevail upon the two of you to answer
some questions about the methods of synthesis of legal authorities used in
your systems of structure and analysis, IREAC and TREAT.2
TREATIS: We are at your disposal.
SOCRATES: Before I start, I must comment that upon seeing both of you
for the first time here today, I cannot help but remark that the two of you
bear a strong resemblance to a distinguished and venerable member of the
Academy, Iracus Simplicitus. Are you related?
IREACUS: We are. The two of us are siblings, and Iracus Simplicitus is
our father.
TREATIS: Iracus Simplicitus was a pupil of Aristotle and formed the core
of his organizational paradigm for legal discourse and analysis, IRAC,
from the topos of invention preferred by Aristotle: the syllogism and the
enthymeme. The major premise of the syllogism is the rule section-the R
of the analysis-and the minor premise is the facts and situation to which
the rule is applied in the analysis or application-the A section of the
analysis-to produce the conclusion of the analysis-the C of the IRAC
paradigm. 3
IREACUS: Treatis and I, in turn, refined the paradigm, to incorporate
another step in the analysis, explanation of the Rule-the E section of
IREAC and TREAT-and to incorporate the legal method of synthesis of
authorities.4 Of course, this is the point at which our systems differ.
SOCRATES: Wait! You're getting way ahead of me. I haven't had the
chance to show off my stupendous insight and keen penetration into the
problem. Let me interject a question, by which I mean, let me go on and
tell you what I already know about this topic and throw in a query at the
end to allow you to say something.
TREATIS: By all means.
IREACUS: Fire away.
SOCRATES: Thank you. Now, at the point of legal analysis when
synthesis occurs, the author has already determined an issue, a legal
2 See Michael D. Murray & Christy H. DeSanctis, Legal Writing and Analysis chs. 2, 6, 7 (2d ed., Found. Press 2009)
(discussing IRAC and TREAT); Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing: Process, Analysis, and Organization chs. 10, 11, 19,20 (5th
ed., Aspen Pub. 2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and persuasive discourse); Kristen K. Robbins,
Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 Vt. L. Rev. 483, 484-87, 492 (2003) (discussing
IRAC and IREAC).
3 See generally sources cited id.
4 See id.
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question that must be answered in order to render advice or advocacy for
a client.' She has researched and compiled a number of applicable
authorities-primary controlling authorities and primary persuasive
authorities and secondary authorities.6 Then the author considers a
synthesis of these authorities.
IREACUS: You are entirely correct.
SOCRATES: In my conversations, I have learned that synthesis of
authorities is universally recognized in the legal academy as being a funda-
mental component of legal analysis' and legal rhetoric,8 including the
exposition of legal reasoning, and the communication of legal argument
and advocacy. I am told that the consensus of the scholarship on this topic
is that a synthesis of authorities found to be on point and controlling is a
necessary part of legal analysis and legal argument in order to accurately
determine and state the prevailing law-the rules-that govern a legal
issue.9 Am I correct so far?
TREATIS: Quite so.
SOCRATES: Authorities that control the disposition of a legal issue must
be reconciled for their explicit statements and pronouncements of the
governing legal standards as well as examined for implicit requirements
that are induced from the controlling authorities. This is established
doctrine that enjoys the nearly unbroken support of the scholarly
commentary,10 is that not right?
IREACUS: You perfectly conceive the meaning, Socrates.
5 Murray & DeSanctis, supra n. 2, at ch. 2.
6 Id. at chs. 2-5.
7 "It would be impossible to do legal research without analyzing, synthesizing, and applying the information found, both to
the original issue and to the research plan developed to address the issue." Sarah Valentine, Legal Research as a Fundamental
Skill: A Lifeboatfor Students and Law Schools, 39 U. Balt. L. Rev. 173, 210 (2010) (citing ABA Sec. Leg. Educ. & Admis. to B.,
Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum: Narrowing the Gap 152 (ABA 1992)); Jane Kent
Gionfriddo, Thinking like a Lawyer: The Heuristics of Case Synthesis, 40 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1, 4 (2007).
8 See George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times 61 (U.
N.C. Press 1980) (discussing Plato's concepts of the dialectic and synthesis, and Aristotle's connection of the dialectic with
rhetoric); see also Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal Scholarship, Teaching and
Ethics, 21 QLR 813, 834 (2003); Steven D. Jamar, Aristotle Teaches Persuasion: The Psychic Connection, 8 Scribes J. Leg.
Writing 61, 66-67 (2002); Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think like a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 121, 125-26
(1994).
9 Synthesis, when used in scholarship or legal analysis, refers to rule formation through a process of synthesis of authorities.
E.g. Helene S. Shapo, Marilyn R. Walter & Elizabeth Fajans, Writing and Analysis in the Law ch. 2(IV), ch. 5(111) (4th ed.,
Found. Press 1999); Deborah A. Schmedemann & Christina L. Kunz, Synthesis: Legal Reading, Reasoning and Writing chs. 4,
6, 9 (3d ed., Aspen Pub. 2007); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Legal Reasoning and Legal Writing chs. 10-13 (5th ed., Aspen Pub.
2005); Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower ofBabel or Building a Discipline? Talking About Legal Writing, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 887,
909-10 (2002); Jamar, supra n. 8, at 67.
10 See sources cited supra nn. 2, 7-9.
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SOCRATES: But here is where I must prevail upon you for under-
standing, for the doctrine of which I speak is undoubtedly referred to as
synthesis of authorities, but is it rule synthesis or explanatory synthesis?
TREATIS: What you are describing is referred to as rule synthesis.
SOCRATES: I suspected this to be the case.
IREACUS: Rule synthesis or rule proof, as Treatis and I conceive of it,"
uses an inductive process to inform or construct the major premise of the
syllogistic structure, IREAC or TREAT.
TREATIS: Rule synthesis follows Aristotle's teaching on the induction and
the example as topoi of invention.12 The invention is construction of
knowledge through an inductive process that draws from multiple
applicable authorities to construct the most accurate and beneficial
statement of the rules that apply to answer the legal issue at hand.
SOCRATES: This teaching of Aristotle is a little bit after my time, but I
surmise that your conception of rule synthesis follows the overall doctrine
of precedent and stare decisis that is part and parcel of the Anglo-
American common-law tradition?13
IREACUS: Yes, and not only that: it allows for advocacy of the
progression of law, either calling for a recognition of the present state of
the law or advocating further progression based on the direction of the
existing authorities. Rule synthesis recognizes that the rules governing a
legal issue rarely are defined by a single authority but rather by a
progression of authorities, one to another, and that the statement of the
rules-the governing legal standards-must be drawn or, in our termi-
nology, induced from a number of authorities.
SOCRATES: You're going to cite Karl Llewellyn or Edward Levi here,14
aren't you?
11 See Murray & DeSanctis, supra n. 2, at chs. 4-5.
12 In rhetoric, the topoi [Greek] or loci [Latin] (singular, topos or locus = "place") are the "topics" or "subjects" of argument
that can be made in various situations. Topoi are developed in the process of inventio [Latin] or heuresis [Greek], which may
be translated as "invention" or "discovery" of the type of argument that will be most persuasive in the situation, and in the
dispositio [Latin] or taxis [Greek] of the argument, which translates as the "arrangement" or "organization" or "disposition" of
the contents of the argument. See Edward P.J. Corbett & Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student 17, 20,
89-91 (4th ed., Oxford U. Press 1999).
13 David S. Romantz & Kathleen Elliott Vinson, LegalAnalysis-The Fundamental Skill 7-9, 34-35, 38 (Carolina Acad. Press
1998); Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 166-67, 1148-79 1211-18, 1379 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., Found. Press 1994); Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation ofEnglish Legal Science:
From Hale to Blackstone, 45 Emory L.J. 437, 448-50 (1996).
14 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 12, 14, 23, 39, 48-49, 70, 72, 77 (Oceana Publications 1960) (orig. ed. 1930); Edward
H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 2-3, 5, 8, 26, 29-30 (U. Chi. Press 1949).
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TREATIS: Yes, and Cardozo, too." Ireacus and I do seek to be realistic
about the role of authorities, particularly cases, in building the construct
of the legal standards governing the issue.
IREACUS: A constitutional provision, statute, or administrative rule or
regulation is a starting point of the process of defining the legal standards
that govern an issue. But in the American legal system, courts interpret
and at times redefine the standards, so a proper analysis of the rules
requires an examination of what has happened to the legal standards over
time. And the demonstration of the process of development of the law
calls for rule synthesis.
SOCRATES: This seems entirely positive, but earlier you suggested that
rule synthesis can be a mode of invention of advocacy of a new direction
in the law.
TREATIS: Rules develop to cover new situations. Patterns develop in the
body of authorities that have been written to cover new and specific situ-
ations brought under the control of an existing general rule by extension
and interpretation, encouraged by the public policies of the area of law in
which the issue is placed. When a new situation is presented for extension
by one interpretation of the rules or another, the analyst can advocate for
a favorable interpretation drawing or inducing support from previous
extensions and interpretations of the same law.16
SOCRATES: Rule synthesis, therefore, examines the authorities and
traces the changes in the law and the patterns revealed in the development
of the legal standards governing the issue; it then compiles a complete, up-
to-the-minute definition of these legal standards, the R section.
IREACUS: You have delivered a splendid restatement of the concept.
SOCRATES: I am not a lawyer, and I do not devote myself to the
painstaking task of writing down legal discourse. (As you can see, I even
rely on my student, Plato, here for the recording of my thoughts in these
dialogues). How do lawyers perform this task of rule synthesis in writing?
IREACUS: Within the taxonomy of the rules governing the issue, it is
logical and customary to proceed from the most general applicable legal
rule from the highest source of the law1 7 to the most specific rules
addressing the particular legal issue at hand in the discussion. A starting
15 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature ofthe Judicial Process 19-25, 51-63 (Yale U. Press 1949) (orig. ed. 1921) (evaluation of
precedents in a process of induction); Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes ofLegal Science 8, 9, 11-12 (Greenwood 1970)
(orig. ed., Colum. U. Press 1928) (induction and "relativity" concerning precedents).
16 See sources cited supra nn. 13-14.
17 In terms of a hierarchy of judicial authority. Murray & DeSanctis, supra n. 2, at ch. 3.
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point of analysis might be a constitutional provision or statutory section,
followed by more particular administrative rules or regulations, followed
by specific rules-both definitional rules' 8 and interpretive rules' 9 from
case law-that address the particular legal issue at hand. 20
In rule synthesis, if you have a single authority (e.g., a constitutional,
statutory, or regulatory provision) that provides the exact wording of the
legal standards that govern the issue, this should be stated first in the rule
section. That articulation should be followed by any further legal
standards (definitional rules or interpretive rules) that explain, modify, or
supplement the elements of the rule found in cases and other authorities
that construe and apply the statute or rule. The same principle applies
when there is a standard wording of the rule, often the version laid down
by a watershed case, which is used consistently by most if not all of the
authorities in the applicable jurisdiction. The author should present the
traditional wording of the rule first, followed by any further explanation
and modification of the rule found in later authorities.
If, however, several applicable authorities that define the legal
standards governing the issue at hand do not agree on the wording of the
applicable rule, then the author must synthesize the precedents into a
coherent statement of the rule and its required elements. Supporting
discussion and commentary about the rule can be presented separately,
but the actual statement of the required elements of the rule should be
presented as cohesively as possible.
TREATIS: Ireacus has explained the theory of legal reasoning and analysis
that supports the practice of rule synthesis. But there are many rhetorical
advantages to rule synthesis, too.
SOCRATES: Rhetoric? You mean cookery?21 Flattery?22
18 Id. at chs. 4, 5. A definitional rule defines a legal rule or
legal standard providing the terms, elements, or require-
ments of the rule or standard. E.g., the rule defining parody
as a form of comment and criticism in copyright law under
18 U.S.C. 5 107 (2011), Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994), and the definition of "parody" as
the use of some elements of a prior author's work to create a
new one that, at least in part, comments on or criticizes the
original author's work, Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
19 Murray & DeSanctis, supra n. 2, at chs. 4, 5. An inter-
pretive rule is a rule issued by a court or provided in another
primary legal authority (constitution, statute, or adminis-
trative rule or regulation) that instructs attorneys and judges
on the proper interpretation and application of a definitional
rule. One example is the Supreme Court's issuance of inter-
pretive rules concerning the copyright fair-use factors of 17
U.S.C. S 107: the factors are to be weighed together in a
case-by-case analysis in light of the purposes of copyright
law, no one factor predominates, and commercial use is
simply one factor to be weighed with the others and is not
dispositive. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78, 584-85.
20 This paragraph reflects standard legal method within the
legal writing discourse community. See e.g. Ruth Ann
McKinney, Reading Like a Lawyer 14 (Carolina Acad. Press
2005); Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal
Discourse: The Ebb and Flow ofReader and Writer, Text and
Context, 49 J. Leg. Educ. 155, 158, 159 (1999) [hereinafter
Berger, New Rhetoric); Denise Riebe, Readers'Expectations,
Discourse Communities, and Effective Bar Exam Answers, 41
Gonz. L. Rev. 481,488-91 (2006).
21 Plato, Gorgias 56-58 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Echo Lib.
2006).
22 Id. at 57-59.
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IREACUS: Please restrain yourself, my dear friend. I'm afraid your
critique of rhetoric is a few thousand years off the mark. Treatis and I do
not speak of mere rhetoric as in the artful embellishment of language for
flattery or deception.2 3 We speak of the discipline that studies the
construction of knowledge, effective communication, and persuasion,
which has enormous implications for legal discourse. 24
SOCRATES: I'm listening, but I am not promising that I'll like it.
TREATIS: Fair enough. In classical rhetoric, rule synthesis is used
primarily as a topic of invention and secondarily as a topic of arrangement.
The invention fits the analysis of multiple authorities into a syllogistic
structure-meeting logos objectives of the communication. It also is a
topic of arrangement involving open demonstration of the analysis-
showing your work, so to speak-which furthers the ethos objectives of the
analysis and communication. 25
SOCRATES: My usual piercing insight is limited by my unfamiliarity with
legal writing, and I am having trouble grasping why open demonstration
of the analysis is both logically persuasive (logos) and further supports
persuasion through the credibility, competence, and benevolence (ethos)
of the author?
IREACUS: In classical rhetorical terms, the structure of a proof-syllo-
gistic structure-is persuasive both substantively and rhetorically.
Substantively, it reveals the components of the analysis-the major and
the minor premises-to examination and refutation. This is the concept of
falsifiability. If the openly demonstrated analysis is not refuted, it is held to
be conclusive when the premises are capable of conclusive determination;
in other words, the proof is absolute when both premises are absolutely
and necessarily true, as in a true syllogism. When the premises are not
susceptible to conclusive determination, as in most instances of legal
analysis where the facts and the law are not susceptible to absolute
certainty of determination, the syllogistic structure is still held to be highly
persuasive because the premises are openly demonstrated and exposed to
23 Against the confusion of rhetoric with mere rhetoric, see Scallen, supra note 8, at 817, 829; Wayne C. Booth,
The Rhetorical Stance, 14 J. College Composition & Comm. 139, 139 (1963) (in Toward a New Rhetoric); Wayne C. Booth,
The Rhetoric of Rhetoric: the Questfor Effective Communication ix-x, 6-7 (Blackwell Pubig. 2004).
24 Michael D. Murray, Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law nn. 14-17 (forthcoming 2011) (copy on file
with author).
25 The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the syllogism, while the structural form of
rhetorical demonstration and legal argument is the enthymeme. See Aristotle, The Rhetoric bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355a (W. Rhys
Roberts & Ingram Bywater trans., Random House 1954). In an enthymeme, a highly probable construction of the applicable
legal principles is applied to a highly probable construction of the specific circumstances of the case at hand so as to describe
a highly probable conclusion or prediction about the application. Id.
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examination and refutation both as to the probability and accuracy of the
statement of the premises and the probability and reliability of the
conclusion drawn from the premises.
Rule synthesis is a form of open demonstration of the analysis of
examples (authorities) that inform the major premise (the rules, legal
standards) of the syllogistic structure of the enthymeme in legal reasoning.
It is falsifiable because the synthesis reveals the authorities that are
synthesized. If the components or the analysis of the combinations of
authorities and the principles induced from these combinations are not
challenged or rebutted, the demonstration promotes persuasion from the
logical arrangement and credibility and benevolence from the frankness
and candor of this form of demonstration. 26
SOCRATES: One could simply pronounce that the rules are thus and
such, without making any demonstration of the process of analysis used to
define the terms of the rules or the authorities from which the definitions
are derived and induced. But this would be persuasive only if the audience
enjoyed some special relationship of trust or deference to the person
pronouncing the rules or if the audience was in a position where
adherence to the pronounced rules was compelled, making persuasion
irrelevant.
TREATIS: Exactly. And when we examine rule synthesis under the
perspectives of modern and contemporary rhetoric, we see that it has
rhetorical advantages, particularly under modern argument theory,
writing-as-a-process theory, and discourse-community theory.
In modern argument theory,27 rule synthesis involves coding the
discourse through analysis of relevant authorities and places the analysis
within the enthymatic structure of an argument of probabilities. The syllo-
gistic structure of the enthymeme in modern argument (or practical
26 In classical rhetoric, the example was the rhetorical companion of the induction, much in the same way that the
enthymeme was the companion of the syllogism. Both forms, the example and the induction, seek to induce information-
construct truth, if you will-from subjects or examples, the difference being that an induction uses absolute, conclusive
truths about the genus and species principles that are demonstrated in the induction, and an example uses probability about
the genus and species principles that are demonstrated in the example. See id. at bk. I, ch. 2 at 1356b, bk. II, ch. 19 at
1392a-1392b.
27 On modern argument theory, see e.g. Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An Annotated Bibliography, 6). ALWD 75, 80-81
(2009); Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated Bibliography, 3 J. ALWD 129, 139 (2006); Linda
L. Berger, OfMetaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign
Finance Regulation, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 949 (2007) (the corporate metaphor in modern argument theory); Linda L. Berger,
What is the Sound ofa Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory ofMetaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J.
ALWD 169 (2004) (use of metaphor in modern argument theory and cognitive studies); Jerome Bruner & Anthony
Amsterdam, Minding the Law chs. 2-3, 6-7 (Harvard U. Press 2002); Frans H. Van Eemeren et al., Fundamentals of
Argumentation Theory: A Handbook ofHistorical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc.
1996); Stephen Toulmin et al., An Introduction to Reasoning (2d ed., Collier Macmillan Pub. 1984); Chaim Perelman & Lucie
Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (U. Notre Dame Press 1969).
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reasoning) constructs the most probable definition of the major premise of
the argument, followed by the most probable statement of the facts and
circumstances at hand in the problem and its rhetorical situation. Rule
synthesis, with its open and falsifiable rendering of the components of the
analysis and the principles induced from the examination and combi-
nations of the components, creates a highly probable and thus highly
persuasive major premise of the argument.
In writing-as-a-process theory,28 rule synthesis involves the open
demonstration of analysis through a systematic process of comparing and
combining authorities to build meaning and comprehension of the author
and her audience. The process constructs the rule section-it defines the
legal standards that govern the issue of the discourse for the benefit of the
author and the audience. The careful, open, and demonstrative process of
rule synthesis allows the author to better understand the rules and their
requirements, exceptions, and limitations, and in turn allows the audience
to understand the same requirements, exceptions, and limitations of the
rules defining the analysis and the discourse. The process of rule-synthesis
analysis is reflective and recursive, causing the author to revisit the same
authorities multiple times to compare them and to induce from them
different nuances of the meaning of the rules to best address the problem
and its audience and rhetorical situation. This produces work that is both
inventive and persuasive in bringing the audience to an understanding and
conviction concerning the discourse.
Under discourse-community theory,2 9 the process of reasoning
through synthesis to inform the major premise-the R section-of the
analysis has become the accepted and expected structure and process of
analysis within the legal writing discourse community. Rule synthesis
devotes attention to the proper authorities based on their rank in the
hierarchy of judicial authority accepted by the legal writing discourse
community. Rule synthesis also follows the discourse community's expec-
tations that a combination of authorities must be used to make a single
28 On writing-as-a-process theory, see Smith, supra note 27, at 141; Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal
Writing Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 Leg. Writing 57 (2000); Berger, New Rhetoric, supra note 20; Carol McCrehan
Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 561 (1997);
Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, "To Say What the Law Is": Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 861 (1995);
Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 163 (1993);
Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J. 1089 (1986).
29 On modern discourse-community theory, see Smith, supra n. 27, at 143; Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking Writing.
and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 Duq. L. Rev. 489 (2002); Pollman, supra n. 9; Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation
Process and the Resistance to In'doctrine"ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary on Mertz's Critical
Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 John Marshall L. Rev. 131 (2000); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is
Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 Dick. L. Rev.7 (1998); J.
Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 35 (1994); Joseph M. Williams, On
the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 Leg. Writing 1 (1991).
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coherent statement of the applicable legal principles that govern the legal
issue at hand.
SOCRATES: You have said that rule synthesis creates the "R" section of
the discourse, or the first half of the major premise of the syllogism. Why
is it only the first half of the major premise? What is the second half?
TREATIS: The second half is the E or explanation section of the analysis:
an explanation of how the rules work. The E section is an analysis of the
authorities that instruct us about how the rules are meant to be inter-
preted and applied in specific, relevant situations.
IREACUS: Treatis is indicating a point of difference in our systems. Are
you ready to go there, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I think so, therefore I am.
IREACUS: In legal discourse, an explanation of how the rules work-how
the rules are to be interpreted and applied-aids the reader in accepting
the argument that the definitions and requirements of the rules (major
premise part I) applied to the facts of the case at hand (minor premise) to
produce the outcome described in the discourse (conclusion). This expla-
nation section is separate from the rule section both structurally and
conceptually: the rule section tells what the rules are-what the
definitions, elements, and requirements of the rules are-and the expla-
nation section tells how the rules work-how the rules are to be
interpreted and applied to specific situations to produce specific
outcomes.
TREATIS: On that much we agree. The purpose of the explanation
section is to demonstrate how the rules work in specific situations. The
specific situations referred to typically are cases-the examples of specific
situations where the rules have been applied in the past to produce a
concrete outcome. This demonstration, in turn, is used to argue how the
rules will work in a specific future situation, namely, the situation of the
client.
SOCRATES: Fair enough. But what is the difference that the two of you
have alluded to?
IREACUS: In IREAC and in most of the prevailing paradigms of legal
discourse, the demonstration is made using a select number of individual
cases. The primary and in most instances exclusive method is direct
analogical reasoning of one historical precedent at a time compared to the
present client situation. The author is advised to be very limited in the
number of historical precedents that are selected because these authorities
must be explained at some length and in detail; often a page or two of text
226
RULE SYNTHESIS AND EXPLANATORY SYNTHESIS
is required for the explanation of the facts, the story, the issues, and how
the rules worked throughout a single historical precedent.
SOCRATES: Why is that much detail required?
IREACUS: In part, because analogical reasoning fits into an analytical
model of direct comparison based on the common-law theory of
precedent and stare decisis and simultaneously relies on a rhetorical
model that is aligned with storytelling and narrative reasoning, in
particular the style trope of parables, myths, or fables that shape reality so
as to place the client's story into the narrative of the precedent. Simple
surface-level comparisons are metaphorical and thus are tropes to inspire
creative thinking and comprehension, but they lack the persuasiveness of
a deeper, detailed comparison of the fundamental policies at work in the
precedent case as compared to the facts and narrative of the client's case.
SOCRATES: My head is swimming. Perhaps it is because I am getting
hungry. Plato, when we are finished here, let's see if Crito can get a nice
rooster from Asclepius. Tell him to pay for it, and don't forget.30
IREACUS: In rhetorical terms, the details of the fable or parable form
recounted through the explanation of the precedent tell the audience the
narrative in which the client's story should be placed. The fable or parable
has a known outcome; this is to be the outcome in the client's case.
Naturally, to be persuasive, the storylines do have to match up-you
cannot simply pick a favorable storyline that has no parallels or
connections to the client's situation.
In similar fashion, the method of direct analogical reasoning fits the
common-law theory of precedent if a precedent is closely aligned with the
client's situation-"on all fours" with the case at hand, it is sometimes said.
In those circumstances, the comparison of the working of the rules in the
precedent case to produce its outcome will be an accurate predictor of the
outcome of the client case. If the audience is a court or tribunal, the court
should feel compelled to decide the case the same way as the precedent.
SOCRATES: Of course, to be highly persuasive or even determinative as
an analogy, the precedent would have to be controlling and recent enough
in time to be considered relevant and not possess details that might
distract the audience away from the similarities or suggest to the audience
distinguishing features of the two cases-the precedent and the case at
hand.
30 See EyeWitness to History, The Suicide ofSocrates, 399 BC, http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/socrates.htm (accessed
Mar. 26, 2011).
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TREATIS: You have keenly grasped the point, as usual, Socrates. What
you have stated is the point of division for Ireacus and me. Analogical
reasoning has built in limitations that make it unattractive for many client
issues and in many rhetorical situations. It works best in terms of analysis
and rhetoric if there is one single case that closely matches to the client's
situation and goes in favor of the client. This is the case that will control
the determination. This is a case with a single, consistent narrative whose
ending is beneficial to the client. When the precedents are not closely
similar to the client's situation, the author must make a more indirect
analogy-"this case is like the client's case in certain ways, although not
exactly similar." In analytical terms, the precedent is not compelling, and
the author's appeal is merely to extend the principles of the case to the
client's case. In rhetorical terms, the author has shifted from a style trope
of parable, myth, or fable to a simple trope of metaphor-this thing is
somewhat like another thing-which is not as exact and certainly not as
compelling as a good parable, myth, or fable to insert the client's story
into.
SOCRATES: If one single case is not appropriate, why wouldn't you just
expound on more cases?
TREATIS: You are limited because you are forced to spend so much time
and page space on each single authority. If the best of the applicable
controlling cases all agree and have the same consistent narrative, then
you can write persuasive discourse using only two or three cases and make
the system work for the audience and the situation. But when the author
has to stretch to reach the first case and must stretch even farther to reach
the second case, the power of the authorities to compel a certain outcome
is reduced. In rhetorical terms, the story will shift from one case to the
next, and this may send a confusing message to the audience. Here is one
story in which you might identify the client; but if not that one, then here
is another story. If that fails, would you believe this third one?
IREACUS: The author will do the best she can picking the most
analogous cases.
TREATIS: But many times none of the cases are particularly close in
terms of facts and policies and the storyline of the precedents. If analogical
reasoning is your only tool, you will be forced to write a weak explanation
section making weak, unpersuasive analogies, and chalk it up to bad luck
for the client not to have one great precedent to ride on.
SOCRATES: Sometimes the client's facts are bad under the terms of the
law, and the precedents can't help the client out of the jam.
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TREATIS: But in many situations, analogical reasoning produces
suboptimal results because there are many precedents, but none partic-
ularly close to the client's own facts and situation.
SOCRATES: Do you then abandon analogical reasoning altogether?
TREATIS: No. In the TREAT method,3 1 I endorse the use of direct
analogical reasoning in the explanation section when you have a directly
relevant, controlling precedent that is extremely similar to the client's
situation. Alternatively, you should use it if there is a small number of
substantially similar precedents that must be carefully distinguished from
the client's situation in the process of arguing that these two or three
precedents do not control the outcome. These tasks warrant the use of a
large amount of text, up to a full page or more in appropriate cases, to fully
describe the precedent so as to analogize to it or distinguish it.
Nonetheless, I believe this situation I am describing when there is a
small number of manifestly similar precedents to compare to the client's
case is an unusual situation, certainly not the majority of situations in
which case law must be evaluated for its impact on the rules that govern a
legal issue. In the majority of situations, there are a sizeable number of
authorities-ten, twelve, fifteen, sometimes twenty or more authorities-
all of which are on point and all of which might be controlling or highly
persuasive. All of the authorities are examples of situations in which the
rules applied to produce a concrete outcome, but none of them are on all
fours with the client's situation. This more typical legal situation calls for
explanatory synthesis.
Explanatory synthesis, as distinguished from rule synthesis, is a
separate process of inducing principles of interpretation and application
concerning the prevailing rules governing a legal issue.32 The induction is
from samples-namely case law-representing specific situations with
concrete facts in which the legal rules have been applied to produce a
concrete outcome.3 Whereas rule synthesis is the component of legal
analysis that combines and reconciles authorities to determine what legal
standards apply to and control a legal issue, explanatory synthesis
combines and contrasts authorities to demonstrate and communicate how
the applicable legal standards work in various situations relevant to the
legal issue at hand.
Explanatory synthesis is not limited to certain areas of law, or even to
legal analysis of situations requiring complicated syntheses of authorities
to determine the applicable rule governing the legal issue. Explanatory
31 See Murray & DeSanctis, supra n. 2, at ch. 6. 33 Id.
32 Id.
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synthesis requires cases-the sample set-in order to perform its
processes of induction. But explanatory synthesis can be employed to
explain or advocate the outcome of any situation calling for legal analysis
that has cases applying the rules on the issue.
SOCRATES: If rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis both use the
inductive form as a topic of invention and arrangement of the demon-
stration, how is the audience to differentiate one from the other?
TREATIS: Substantively, by the purpose of explanatory synthesis, and
structurally, by the form of explanatory synthesis. The purpose of the
explanation section is to explain how the rules work, not what the rules
are. The explanation section must follow and be separate from the rule
section-it would be very confusing and counterproductive to mix expla-
nation into the middle of the rule section, defining a rule and explaining a
bit about it, and jumping back to another rule, and explaining a bit about
that, and jumping yet again to another rule. Instead, the rule section
should use rule synthesis to present the legal standards that govern the
issue together, in one complete statement of the rules, followed by the
explanation section using explanatory synthesis that proceeds to demon-
strate how these legal standards actually work when applied to concrete
factual situations.
The structure of explanatory syntheses is designed for demonstrative
inductive reasoning that presents the principles concerning how the rules
are to be interpreted and applied first, followed by the authorities from
which the principles are induced. Each principle is to be induced from
multiple authorities, so the citation will appear different from a statement
of the rule in the rule section where only one statute or at most a very
small number of controlling authorities is the source of a definitional rule.
The citation to each authority that is used as an example of a situation
where the rule was applied to produce a concrete outcome shall be
followed by a parenthetical that explains in as few words as possible the
facts and circumstances and outcome of the case relevant to the appli-
cation of the rule. Thus the structure is the following: Interpretive
Principle-Citation 1 (details concerning the application of the rule in
citation 1), Citation 2 (details concerning the application of the rule in
citation 2), Citation 3 (details concerning the application of the rule in
citation 3), and so on.3 1
IREACUS: Is it necessary to follow the same structure each time? Isn't
that repetitive?
34 For the sack of brevity, I have avoided copying full-blown textual examples of the process, but numerous examples are
provided in Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 2, at chapter 6.
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TREATIS: Each part is necessary: the principle stated is the product of the
induction. It reveals the interpretive principle concerning how the rules
are to be interpreted and applied based on the case examples cited in the
synthesis. The citations are necessary to show that the principle is
supported by multiple authorities. And the parentheticals explain the
details of facts, policy, holding, and outcome of the rule application that
are necessary to explain how each case example supports the interpretive
principle stated in the synthesis. All of the parts must be stated openly
because this is demonstrative reasoning, open to examination and refu-
tation, and thus highly persuasive if it is not rebutted. The structure stated
here is the structure of a single explanatory synthesis. It will be repeated
several times with new interpretive principles, new authorities, and new
parentheticals as the author crafts the explanation section so as to demon-
strate how the rules from the rule section are properly applied to
circumstances such as the client's to produce the outcome predicted or
advocated by the author.
IREACUS: Why parentheticals? Don't readers hate parentheticals? Won't
they skip over them?
TREATIS: The use of parentheticals is necessary, 35 and for those who
truly dislike parentheticals, I emphasize that they are a necessary evil
because the two alternatives are worse. One alternative would be to not
provide any details from the case examples showing how the rule appli-
cation worked in the individual case. This would defeat the purpose and
structure of demonstrative reasoning. The interpretive principle would be
stated and supported by citations, but the synthesis would rely on the
audience to trust that the case examples cited truly support the principle
in some manner relevant to the client's case. It becomes opaque, not
subject to examination or refutation, nonfalsifiable, and thus dependent
on trust of the author and her ethos to be persuasive. The task of main-
taining this delicate balance of trust and ethos can be avoided by showing
your work-revealing the details of the application of the rule and the
policies of the case to the facts and circumstances of the case.
Alternative two is to provide the citation and supporting explanation
of the details of the application of the rule and the policies of the case to
the facts and circumstances of the case in footnotes, not parentheticals in
the text. This may make the text easier to read, but footnotes are hated as
much or more than parentheticals, and outside of scholarly legal writing in
35 E.g. Soma R. Kedia, Redirecting the Scope ofFirst-Year Writing Courses: Toward a New Paradigm ofTeaching Legal
Writing, 87 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 147, 170, 176 (2010); Ira P. Robbins, Semiotics, Analogical Legal Reasoning and the Cf
Citation: Getting Our Signals Uncrossed, 48 Duke L.J. 1043, 1076-79 (1999).
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journals and law reviews, footnotes are not accepted as a method for the
presentation and analysis of legal authority.3 6 Often in litigation contexts,
local rules limit the use of footnotes for substantive presentation and
analysis of authority.37 And footnotes are far easier to skip than paren-
theticals because they are placed at the bottom of the page away from the
very principles they illustrate and support.
Parentheticals may be skipped, but that is not a fatal disability of the
theory and structure of explanatory synthesis. The interpretive principle
induced from the cases is the most import part of the synthesis. The
number of authorities used and the quality of the authorities used is the
next most important part of the strength and persuasiveness of the
synthesis. The parentheticals are used to openly demonstrate to the reader
the workings of the analysis-if the reader skips the work but still accepts
the interpretive principle, then the author has successfully communicated
the point. The appearance of the workings of the analysis gives assurance
to the reader that the author has gone to the trouble of breaking down,
comparing, and contrasting the authorities so that the reader is presented
with a comprehensive analysis of how the rules function and their proper
application to the client's facts and circumstances.
A reader can glance at the first or last lines of a complex mathematical
proof and happily accept that the proof is sound with the obvious
assurance that each step of the proof is open to examination if and when
the reader desires to investigate it. The same is true for any particular
explanatory synthesis: the reader can stop and read the parentheticals of
any synthesis whose interpretive principle is troubling, surprising, or
counterintuitive to the reader, while skipping the details in the paren-
theticals of any synthesis whose interpretive principle already is familiar
and acceptable to the reader. This turns out to be a friendly, time-saving
device compared to the paragraphs of text that must be read and digested
in the direct analogical method in order to establish the narrative and
communicate the analogy.
SOCRATES: You have analogized explanatory synthesis to a mathe-
matical proof, but it is not a true induction, not a scientific proof?
TREATIS: It is a rhetorical induction-an example, in Aristotelian
terms-not a true induction.38 The interpretive principles are not neces-
sarily and conclusively induced from the example cases.
36See generally Joan Ames Magat, Bottomheavy: Legal Footnotes, 60 J. Leg. Educ.65 (2010).
37 E.g. D.C. Cir. R., LO.P. IX(A)(8); 3d Cir. R. 32.2(a); 8th Cir. R., LO.P. I1l(I)(3).
38 See supra n. 34.
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SOCRATES: Your assertion that an author must induce the legal
standards from the authorities in the rule section and separately induce
principles about how these rules work in the explanation section suggests
to me that what the courts say the rules are does not necessarily match
what they do with those rules when applied to actual cases presented for
adjudication.39
TREATIS: That observation is one of the principal reasons that I
developed the TREAT method and explanatory synthesis. The use of both
rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis is significant as a means of proper
legal analysis and a rhetorical topic of demonstrative reasoning that
advances the persuasiveness of the legal discourse. Rule synthesis and
explanatory synthesis do not merely seek to establish the applicable rules;
they also seek, through rhetorical exposition, to explain and persuade the
audience that the author's prediction or recommendation of the outcome
of the situation is correct. Rule synthesis allows the author to construct a
rule section that is a favorable environment for the client, and explanatory
synthesis allows the author to demonstrate the successful situations under
the rules when parties prevail and contrast the unsuccessful situations
when parties fail. Both forms of synthesis contribute to constructing a
reality in which the client will prevail on the legal issue.
SOCRATES: How can that be? The rules are what they are, is that not so?
TREATIS: An individual statement of a rule is what it is, but a synthesized
construct of the rules is created through rule synthesis using the language
selected by the author. An individual case tells one narrative in which the
rules applied to the client's facts to produce a single outcome, but a
synthesis of cases can be created by the author to demonstrate the many
narratives and storylines of successful parties, implicating the public
policies of the area of the law and the values of the audience and achieving
persuasion on many levels of logos, ethos, and pathos.
SOCRATES: Is this not trickery and deceit?
TREATIS: Rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis should never be used
to lie about the authorities. These methods are openly demvonstrative
about the steps of the process of constructing the rule section and the
explanation section. All of the stages of the analysis and the data set used
in the analysis-the rules and case examples-are openly and trans-
parently presented to the audience for examination. Lying about any rule
39 Llewellyn, supra n. 14, at 14.
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or authority would cause the entire process to become suspect and defeat
the entire purpose of the demonstration.
Legal authorities rarely speak for themselves, and when they do, the
author can quote them. But in the usual course of American legal method,
a single authority is but one step on the path of creating the complete
construct of the legal principles governing the legal issue at hand. Rule
synthesis identifies the additional authorities that alter or build on the
initial authorities, and it combines the authorities to produce a complete
statement of the rules. Similarly, a single controlling authority rarely
presents a complete, satisfactory narrative and storyline that matches the
public policies of the area of the law with the values of the audience in a
manner that aligns with the client's facts and objectives.
When all of the stars align with a single authority that casts a
favorable light on the client's case, then direct analogical reasoning is the
most efficient, the most persuasive, and the most beneficial method of
explanation of the workings of the rules toward the client's objectives. In
other circumstances, when a single, perfectly aligned authority favorable
to the client is not present, the author must work with a combination of
authorities that must be examined, combined, and contrasted in order to
explain the workings of the rules. The goal is the same: to demonstrate
that the rules, the public policies, and the facts and circumstances of the
client's situation still can align in a way that will appeal to the values of the
audience, but instead of using one authority, the author must use several.
The method does not contemplate performing one, overwhelming
explanatory synthesis, but many. Incremental principles of interpretation
may be induced from different sets of precedents. Different, parallel
storylines may be drawn out from several cases and depicted in such a way
that the storylines converge with the client's narrative. Public policies may
be exhibited in a variety of factual settings to reveal that the client's facts
further the workings of the policies. Explanatory syntheses should explore
the deeper, fundamental connections between cases whose outcome is
favorable to the client and those that are not, so as to analogize to a whole
group of favorable precedents and distinguish an entire group of unfa-
vorable precedents.
IREACUS: I don't expect Socrates to ask this, but I gather that you assert
that your method of explanation-explanatory synthesis-has rhetorical
advantages over direct analogical reasoning?
TREATIS: I do. Explanatory synthesis has all of the same rhetorical
advantages of rule synthesis and quite a few other advantages over direct
case-to-case analogical reasoning.
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You will recall that rule synthesis met modern-argument-theory
objectives of practical reasoning through an inductive method to inform
the major premise of the syllogistic argument form. Explanatory synthesis
follows a similar method of inductive reasoning to construct the most
probable explanation of how the rules apply to varying factual situations in
multiple authorities. Explanatory synthesis, with its open and falsifiable
induction of interpretive principles from a sample set of controlling
authorities creates a highly probable and thus highly persuasive argument
concerning the application of the rules.
In writing-process theory, explanatory synthesis involves the open
demonstration of analysis through a systematic process of comparing and
combining authorities to build meaning and comprehension of the author
and her audience regarding the various ways the rules interact with the
facts of cases and the public policies of the area of law. The process
constructs the explanation section-it defines the principles of interpre-
tation and application that will govern the application of the rules to the
issue for the benefit of the author and the audience. The careful, open, and
demonstrative process of explanatory synthesis allows the author to better
understand the application of the rules and how this implicates the public
policies of the area and the values of the audience, and in turn demon-
strates these lessons for the education and persuasion of the audience. The
process of explanatory-synthesis analysis is reflective and recursive,
causing the author to revisit the same authorities multiple times to
compare them and to induce from them different nuances of the rules and
policies, and to draw out the different narratives of success and failure
under the applications of the rules. This reflective and recursive process
constructs an explanation section that best addresses the problem and its
audience and rhetorical situation. This produces work that is both
inventive and persuasive in bringing the audience to an understanding and
conviction concerning the discourse.
Under discourse-community theory, the process of reasoning through
synthesis to inform the second half of the major premise-the E section of
the analysis-is the accepted and expected structure and process of
analysis within the legal writing discourse community. Explanatory
synthesis devotes attention to the proper authorities based on their rank in
the hierarchy of judicial authority accepted by that community.
Explanatory synthesis can develop many and varied principles of interpre-
tation-many more than direct analogical reasoning-because it can work
with a much larger number of authorities, and weave them together so
that the client's case can be analogized to whole groups of favorable
precedents and distinguished from whole groups of unfavorable
precedents.
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Explanatory synthesis as used in the TREAT format also is rhetorically
advantageous under the newest school of contemporary rhetoric-law and
economics.40
SOCRATES: The rhetoric of Homo Economicus and Posnero? Do tell.
TREATIS: The rhetorical canons of contemporary law and economics
apply four topoi of invention and arrangement and four style tropes to
legal discourse: the primacy of the forms of analysis of mathematics and
science, the concept of law as a system of incentives and costs, the
rhetorical theory of efficiency, and the rhetorical lessons of contemporary
rational-choice theory.41
The syllogistic and inductive structures of TREAT and explanatory
synthesis are the same structures used in mathematical and scientific
proof. The very concept that the components of a legal argument can be
phrased in the form of an induction and a syllogism taking the form of a
proof enhances the persuasiveness of the discourse. This is both rhetor-
ically advantageous and substantively advantageous because the power of
the mathematical and scientific forms of proof lies in their open demon-
stration of the steps and components of the analysis in a transparent and
falsifiable presentation. 42
Explanatory synthesis further incorporates the advantages of mathe-
matics and science by increasing the number of authorities that can
efficiently be analyzed in the discourse and from which the principles of
interpretation can be induced, thus increasing the reliability of the
analysis. Explanatory synthesis in effect increases the number-the "n"-
of the sample set, which increases the reliability and persuasiveness of the
principles induced from that sample set. Because the method allows for
exposition of many interpretive principles using multiple authorities in a
comparatively small amount of space (roughly one-third to one-half page
per synthesis, depending on the number of authorities synthesized and the
length and complexity of the parentheticals required), explanatory
synthesis provides an elegant solution to the rhetorical problem of the
client's situation, which is preferred by mathematics and science. 43
Explanatory synthesis performs an open demonstration of the analysis
of multiple authorities as an incentive to the reader. The reader is invited
to avoid the cost of delving into such a large number of authorities because
the work of the analysis has been performed openly, subject to exami-
nation and refutation. Opaque or unsubstantiated reasoning, overworking
or stretching an analogy to a precedent that is not closely aligned to the
40 Murray, supra n. 24. 42 Id.
41 Id. 43 Id.
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client's narrative and rhetorical situation, imposes a cost on the reader
who must take the time to unpack the analogy, evaluate whether it is
analogous, and still might have to invest the time to compare the analogy
to other controlling authorities that also are on point.
Explanatory synthesis is efficient in its method of using a greater
number of authorities to substantiate and apply a greater number of inter-
pretive principles to make a more persuasive discourse. It also allows for
the demonstration of patterns of narratives and storylines found in more
than one authority so as to appeal to the values and preferences of the
modern, rational audience. The typical legal audience is prone to the same
biases and heuristics as any audience of decisionmakers, and explanatory
synthesis creates opportunities to anticipate and target audience biases or
shortcuts. Explanatory synthesis, compared to direct analogical reasoning,
does not put all of the rhetorical eggs in one or two baskets by relying on
the principles of interpretation and application that can be learned from
one or two precedents. It can present a series of interpretive principles to
address many different audiences and situations, and support the prin-
ciples with a larger number of authorities.
SOCRATES: You have explained this matter well. I have a much better
understanding of the dual role of cases in the common-law system-both
as sources of rules and legal standards and as concrete examples of situ-
ations where the rules have been applied to produce concrete outcomes. I
understand that rule synthesis forms the rule section, which contains both
definitional rules and interpretive rules, and that explanatory synthesis is
used in a completely different section, the explanation section, the
purpose of which is to explain and demonstrate how the rules work as
opposed to what the rules are. Treatis has explained his critique of direct
analogical reasoning as the sole method of explaining how rules work, and
he has given me much to think about concerning the advantages of an
inductive synthesis of authorities to create the explanation section.
I am afraid the day is growing long, the sun is getting hot, and Plato
and I have to see Crito about that rooster. This way let us go; and in this
exhort all men to follow, in the way to which you trust and in which you
exhort me to follow you."
IREACUS: Farewell, Socrates.
TREATIS: Best wishes.
44 See Plato, supra n. 21, at 88.
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